Do Reciprocity and Public Equality Really Require Compliance with the Law?

Fair-play accounts of political obligation traditionally hold that persons who benefit from mutually beneficial cooperative schemes owe fair returns to those who bear the burdens necessary to sustain them. Alexander Motchoulski’s recent account is an important attempt to defend fair-play accounts of political obligation, mainly by arguing that the principles of reciprocity and public equality together can avert a famous challenge to such accounts, namely, the problem of open-ended reciprocity. The essence of this problem is that the principle of reciprocity does not specify the appropriate manner of reciprocation. In this paper, I challenge Motchoulski’s argument in two respects. First, by examining the condition of acceptability in the principle of reciprocity, I question the normative weight the principle of reciprocity is expected to carry within fair-play accounts. I then challenge Motchoulski’s argument based on the principle of public equality, arguing that this principle cannot plausibly play the role assigned to it in averting the problem of open-ended reciprocity.