Across courts and workplaces, appearance functions as a condition of institutional visibility. This article theorizes aesthetic governance as a sociolegal mechanism through which law regulates bodies by allocating perceptual attention under conditions of finite observational capacity and dense normative expectations. In rule-saturated environments, scrutiny cannot be evenly distributed. Aesthetic deviation lowers thresholds of attention, concentrates observation, and increases exposure probability prior to interpretation. Using the concepts of proxy criminalization and anticipatory governance, the article shows how formally neutral standards of decorum and professionalism encode visible difference as scrutiny-relevant and extend attention over time. Intensified observation amplifies minor deviations, increasing the likelihood that they become actionable even where interpretive standards remain neutral. By locating inequality at the level of exposure rather than judgment, the article demonstrates how differential enforcement can emerge without overt bias or formal rule change.
Veronica Valencia Gonzalez (Mon,) studied this question.