This article examines governance variations in international organizations during transnational crises, suggesting implications for multilateralism.
This article examines the varied impact of transnational crises on the governance capacities of international organizations (IOs). Most scholarship assumes that crises work either as a constraint or as an opportunity for IOs. However, the example of the COVID-19 pandemic illustrates that governance opportunities and constraints vary both across and within IOs over time. Integrating insights from global governance complexity and crisis studies, we develop a theoretical framework to account for these variations. We draw attention to both IOs’ relative positioning vis-à-vis each other and crisis temporality. In the age of IOs’ politicization amidst geopolitical tensions, we argue that focal IOs are likely subjected to heightened contestation during the initial “fast-burning” phase of a crisis, reducing their ability to act. In contrast, non-focal IOs, operating under less political scrutiny, may use their leeway to expand their activities and address urgent governance needs. As a crisis transitions to the “slow-burning” phase, focal IOs tend to regain agency, while non-focal IOs scale back their extraordinary activities. Providing comparative insights on WHO, NATO, and the WFP during the pandemic, we highlight the critical, yet underappreciated, role of non-focal IOs in ensuring governance continuity and challenge binary narratives about crisis effects on multilateralism.
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Hofmann et al. (2026) studied this question.
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