Recorded Crime, Reported Crime: Measured Underreporting and Partial Identification of the States-of-Emergency Effect on Crime in Peru (2024-2026)

Working paper (English + Spanish versions included). Governments evaluate mano-dura security policies against recorded crime, but recorded crime is a censored, endogenous measurement: whether a victim files a police complaint depends on institutional trust and police presence, which the policy itself changes. Using Peru's 2024-2026 states of emergency, we make this reporting endogeneity measurable rather than assumed. Combining a district-month panel of police complaints (SIDPOL), a verified inventory of emergency decrees, and the national victimization survey (ENAPRES), three findings follow. First, the recorded effect on extortion complaints is estimator-fragile: a two-way fixed-effects Poisson yields +15 percent but a heterogeneity-robust staggered estimator collapses it to a sign-mixed null. Second, identified directly from the survey, the reporting rate of extortion rose from 7.3 percent in 2017-2021 to 23.7 percent in 2022-2024 (survey-design-adjusted +16 percentage points, 95 percent CI +8.5 to +24.0, p<0.001; weighting-sensitive, unweighted +8.2 points), about five times the largest increase for any other crime (an internal control comparison); the eightfold rise in recorded extortion is therefore substantially a reporting phenomenon, not only more crime. Third, the clean lethal-violence outcome that could adjudicate the emergency effect is not openly available at monthly district resolution. We formalize the resulting partial identification with Manski bounds disciplined by the measured reporting rate. This version is rewritten for readability -- plain language, an explicit Objective/Hypothesis/Data-and-Method/Contribution box, a worked numerical example, and every technical term glossed on first use -- with all statistics unchanged, and includes a full Spanish-language version (PDF _ES). Open and reproducible; runs on an ordinary computer.