Dynamic CSR and Quality Effort Decisions in E-Commerce Supply Chains Under Reference Quality Effects

The rise of e-commerce live-streaming has reshaped the communication of product quality and corporate social responsibility (CSR) information, making consumer reference quality an important factor in supply chain operational decisions. This paper investigates how the reference quality effect influences CSR efforts, the manufacturer’s quality effort, and profits among supply chain members, and compares dynamic decisions and equilibrium outcomes across three sale modes: traditional e-commerce mode (mode T), brand-led self-streaming mode (mode B), and influencer live-streaming mode (mode I). We develop a differential game model for a two-echelon supply chain comprising a manufacturer and a brand owner to derive optimal decisions and equilibrium outcomes and compare them across these modes. We then introduce a reward–penalty contract supported by blockchain technology to examine its role in improving supply chain coordination under decentralized decision making. The results show that a stronger reference quality effect encourages the manufacturer to increase quality effort but reduces the CSR efforts of both the manufacturer and the brand owner, as well as live-streaming effort. Among the three sale modes, mode I induces the highest levels of the manufacturer’s quality effort and CSR effort by both members, and leads to the greatest accumulation of brand reputation. However, the manufacturer’s profit ranking across sale modes is conditional. When the demand enhancing effect of influencer effort is limited and the reference quality effect is strong, the manufacturer may earn a higher profit in mode B than in mode I. Although the reward–penalty contract enhances the manufacturer’s CSR and quality effort, excessive reward–penalty intensity increases the manufacturer’s cost burden and may reduce its profit below the level achieved under decentralized decision making. Blockchain technology enhances the effectiveness of the reward–penalty contract in coordinating the supply chain, thereby further increasing total supply chain profit under contract coordination. When blockchain plays a sufficiently strong role, total supply chain profit under the contract may even exceed that under centralized decision making without blockchain.