ABSTRACT This comparative study spanning more than two decades examines how corporatist institutions shape the distribution of environmental tax revenue between producers and consumers. Environmental taxes have become a key policy instrument for addressing climate change and other environmental problems, but their effectiveness and political viability likely depend on how these taxes are collected and distributed. We develop two competing theoretical perspectives with opposing expectations: corporatist structures could facilitate sustainable producer responsibility through coordinated bargaining and long‐term agreements or enable organized producers to shift tax burdens onto consumers. Using panel data from 29 countries covering the period 1995–2018 and error‐correction models, we find that corporatism is associated with lower producer shares of environmental tax revenues. The study suggests that corporatist institutions may contribute to environmental tax cost shifting to consumers, potentially constraining producer incentives for green transitions and provoking public opposition to environmental taxation.
P.A. Van Dalen (Thu,) studied this question.