China's growing influence in the South China Sea (SCS) extends beyond traditional maritime security to undersea communication cables, creating new risks for digital infrastructure, crisis stability, and defence planning. Using a qualitative case study of the SEA-ME-WE 6 cable project (2020-2025), this article argues that U.S.-China competition exemplifies pre-emptive infrastructure power, whereby states shape cable networks at the construction stage to secure future strategic advantage. It shows how contested maritime conditions, legal ambiguity, and procurement intervention reshape cable governance, securitisation, network fragmentation, and operational vulnerability in the SCS. The article refines debates on infrastructure power and links South China Sea geopolitics to digital sea lines of communication. It also highlights implications for Taiwan's defence and security, where cable disruption, repair delays, and attribution failures may heighten vulnerability during grey-zone coercion or cross-strait crises.
Hwang et al. (Thu,) studied this question.