This article proposes a specialized cyber-intervention unit to prevent genocide by disrupting propaganda and command networks.
Despite the 1948 Genocide Convention and the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (R2P), the United Nations (UN) has failed to prevent genocide due to political costs, bureaucracy, and sovereignty concerns. While cyber tools for atrocity prevention are explored, systematic analysis to genocide remains limited. Addressing this, the article proposes a specialized UN cyber-intervention unit to bypass conventional barriers. Using a hypothetical-analogical method with the 2007 Estonia cyberattacks and 1994 Rwandan genocide, it demonstrates how disrupting genocidaires’ propaganda and command networks could save lives. Diverging from prior R2P-focused studies, it advances a genocide-specific, technical disruption model, offering policymakers actionable prevention tools.
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Yavuz Akdağ (2026) studied this question.
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