This preprint introduces the Bohra Asymmetric Utility Model (BAUM v1.5), a conceptual framework explaining why armed conflicts may persist beyond the point at which continued fighting appears irrational for the principal belligerents. The model distinguishes between "Receivers"—actors directly bearing the human, political, and economic costs of conflict—and "Providers"—actors whose incentives may remain positively associated with sustaining the relationships that enable conflict continuation. A central contribution of the framework is the "No Coordination Assumption," which explains conflict persistence without requiring conspiracy, collusion, or centralized coordination among Providers. Instead, the model proposes that individually rational incentive structures may collectively contribute to prolonged conflicts. The paper positions BAUM alongside Ripeness Theory and Spoiler Theory, introduces the conceptual metaphor "Poison for the Fighters, Meat for the Suppliers," and develops a formal theoretical specification intended to generate empirically testable hypotheses for future research. The work is purely conceptual and does not make empirical claims regarding any ongoing or historical conflict. Keywords: Ripeness Theory, Conflict Persistence, Receiver–Provider Theory, BAUM, Conflict Sustainment, International Security, Peace Studies.
Manoj Kumar Rampratap Bohra (Fri,) studied this question.