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This article examines how Armenia and Georgia, two small states navigating the contested geopolitics of the South Caucasus, are devising distinct geostrategies in response to their condition of “in-betweenness”. Situated between the European Union’s soft power appeal and Russia’s hard power assertiveness, both nations face acute security dilemmas that have intensified since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. We analyse the strategic calculations shaping their foreign policies, focusing on how elites in Yerevan and Tbilisi perceive and leverage the asymmetric power projections of the EU and Russia. Our findings reveal that despite their different alliance histories, both states have adopted nuanced hedging strategies. Armenia, disillusioned by its traditional security guarantor, is pursuing a strategy of cautious security diversification, while Georgia’s ruling elite has adopted a policy of pragmatic accommodation with Russia to mitigate key source of military threat and also ensure regime survival, even as it maintains a formal EU accession track. By centring the agency of Armenia and Georgia, we demonstrate that their policies are not passive reactions but calculated strategies designed to maximise autonomy and security in a region where the EU’s civilian power model proves insufficient to alter the fundamental logic of hard power politics.
Kakachia et al. (Thu,) studied this question.
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