Economic sanctions and global authoritarianism: the ethics of international leverage

In light of the declining effectiveness of traditional forms of influence, should states seek to develop sanctions capacity and cultivate new forms of international leverage more generally to help fulfil global responsibilities? This paper argues that the development of sanctions capability is permissible only when the likelihood of abuse is sufficiently low – and, in such conditions, is morally required. The paper first defends the case for expanding states' capacity to employ economic sanctions, before addressing three objections. The first two – that developing sanctions capacity and leverage more generally will lead to an economic arms race and that it will exacerbate the dominance of stronger states over weaker ones – are rejected. The paper then turns to a third, more non-ideal objection concerning the risk of abuse from the authoritarian capture of such leverage. Here it argues that when there is a substantial risk of abuse, expanding international leverage becomes impermissible. Indeed, in such circumstances, states bear self-limiting duties to reduce their capacity to impose economic sanctions – and to curtail their international leverage more broadly—when the danger of abuse is sufficiently serious.