The balance of nuclear humility: Techno-optimism, complexity, and the perils of nuclear primacy

Scholars of brinkmanship have long debated whether nuclear crises are dominated by a balance of resolve, or whether a technologically superior competitor may offset that balance with advanced weapons. Recent studies argue superiority matters, and that accuracy of modern strategic missiles creates a “new era of counterforce dominance.” Yet counterforce enthusiasts overlook an important technological headwind: the complexity of advanced weapon systems can confound nuclear planners’ ability to predict weapon performance in a real nuclear exchange. This challenge is particularly acute for counterforce systems that cannot be tested in operational settings, and whose failure would bring catastrophic consequences on their user. Drawing from complexity theory and science and technology studies, I argue that contemporary nuclear competitions are beset by a balance of nuclear humility: states with more technologically demanding nuclear doctrines can be less confident of their technical knowledge, and hence less certain in success of their nuclear missions. More humble competitors that merely threaten retaliation can address their vulnerabilities with relatively low-tech modifications of existing technologies. I illustrate an example using Monte Carlo simulation of counterforce strikes with modern US strategic missiles on China’s silo-based missile force. I show that small variations in parameters that the attacker cannot precisely know correspond to wide variation in strike outcomes, and that some of those unknowns emerge from sophistication of advanced weapons themselves. The resulting uncertainty in costs to attacker complicates popular strategic theories of damage limitation.