One Nation, One Election? Federalism, constitutional limits, and the politics of synchronization in India

This article critically evaluates India's ‘One Nation, One Election' (ONOE) proposal by theorizing electoral timing as a core dimension of constitutional design rather than a mere procedural variable. Advancing the concept of temporal federalism, the study frames temporal differentiation as a constitutive element of India's federal bargain. Grounded in basic structure jurisprudence and second-order election theory, the analysis demonstrates how synchronization risks eroding state autonomy and amplifying national coattail effects. Comparative insights from Nepal and South Africa further highlight the limits of cross-system transferability. While acknowledging potential administrative efficiencies, the article argues that ONOE threatens representative accountability and parliamentary stability during midterm dissolutions. Even the proposed two-cluster model offers only a partial compromise. Ultimately, the author advocates for cautious, incremental reforms, such as voluntary clustering, to safeguard the plural, asymmetrical, and multilevel character of India’s federal parliamentary democracy, prioritizing institutional integrity over wholesale temporal restructurings.