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Qualitative policy analysis reveals systemic paralysis of intermediate supervisory authority in decentralized governance, highlighting failures of the integrated prefectural model.
In decentralized unitary states, the Governor theoretically functions as a vital transmission belt for central mandates. However, in post-authoritarian Indonesia, this role faces a profound efficacy crisis. This study investigates the Hollow Prefect phenomenon, where the Governor’s authority to supervise district heads is systematically paralyzed despite strengthened legal mandates. Drawing on interpretive analysis of elite interviews with 37 strategic actors and policy documents across three provinces (Jakarta, West Java, Bali), we reveal that the Governor is trapped in a common agency dilemma. We identify three mechanisms driving this failure: Structural Ambiguity, where mandates lack coercive sanctions; Political Insubordination, where elected Regents leverage their electoral shield to bypass the Governor; and Institutional Decoupling, resulting in ceremonial compliance. The findings challenge the efficacy of the integrated prefectural model in large democracies, suggesting that without tenure security linked to the centre, the prefect becomes a rival politician rather than a state agent.
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Khairi et al. (2026) studied this question.
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