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Coordination among opposition parties is crucial for effective electoral mobilisation in electoral authoritarian regimes, yet deep societal cleavages complicate this process. Using the Turkish case, this article examines how Turkey’s main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party-Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP), navigated these divisions to form ideologically diverse pre-election alliances. The study identifies CHP’s dual strategy: (1) a Downsian defence approach, which involves moderating positions on divisive issues to appeal to a broader electorate, and (2) deepening the democracy-autocracy cleavage to unify opposition forces. The findings highlight the agency of opposition parties in forming electoral alliances and promoting democratic values, illustrating that the rise of regime cleavage is not merely a structural phenomenon, but a deliberate process strategically driven by opposition leaders.
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Esen et al. (2026) studied this question.
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