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The study aims to model how introducing new criteria can alter the evaluation of fixed alternatives in political decisions.

July 14, 2026Open Access

Verified Criterion Expansion and Collective Choice: Unanimity Cycles and the Geometry of Dimension-Proofness

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The study aims to model how introducing new criteria can alter the evaluation of fixed alternatives in political decisions.
Formal modeling of criterion manipulation in decision-making processes
Analysis of preference profiles and directed graphs
Application of combinatorial results like Sperner's theorem to examine criteria interactions
Identification of cycles among unanimous profiles when responses to alternative pairs can vary
A demonstration that strategyproof rules can survive only when decisive voters lack favorable criteria
Establishment of conditions where a rule can be nonconstant and immune to criterion manipulation

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Randomized trial shows how new criteria influence collective decisions, suggesting strategic implications for political actors.

K. Fathi (2026) studied this question.

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