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Bibliometric indicators play a central role in contemporary research evaluation, shaping decisions about funding, careers, and institutional legitimacy. While extensive critical work has examined their methodological limitations and practical effects, less attention has been paid to the philosophical assumptions—and conceptual limits—that render bibliometric evaluation intelligible and authoritative in the first place. This article addresses that gap by analysing the foundations of bibliometrics through a series of interconnected philosophical problem-spaces. The article examines bibliometric evaluation as a regime of knowledge that rests on specific ontological, epistemological, temporal, and normative assumptions. Ontologically, bibliometrics presupposes a conception of scholarly activity as a collection of discrete and stabilised outputs rather than as a processual practice. Epistemologically, it equates measurability with visibility, thereby privileging what can be rendered comparable over what can be meaningfully understood. Temporally, it favours short-term recognition and cumulative continuity, making it poorly equipped to capture conceptual rupture, delayed impact, and paradigm change. Drawing on a range of philosophical perspectives—including Kant, Wittgenstein, Kuhn, Marx, Foucault, Bourdieu, and Feyerabend—the article shows how bibliometric indicators function not merely as descriptive tools, but as instruments of valuation, normalisation, and power. Particular attention is paid to contemporary developments such as Open Access, new metrics, and normative frameworks within scientometrics, which are interpreted as sites of paradigmatic tension rather than straightforward solutions to the limits of evaluation. The article argues that the constraints of bibliometric evaluation are not accidental or merely technical, but structural and conceptual. Rather than calling for ever more refined indicators, it advocates a reflexive and pluralistic understanding of evaluation that recognises the contingency of metrics, remains attentive to what resists quantification, and resists the naturalisation of particular evaluative regimes. In doing so, the article contributes to a philosophical rethinking of bibliometrics as a practice that both reveals and reshapes—and necessarily leaves unsaid—key dimensions of scholarly knowledge.
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Juan Gorraiz (2026) studied this question.
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