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This article explores how the trend toward competitive multipolarity both at the global and regional level is reshaping conflict dynamics in Western Sahara and intra-Maghreb relations. It examines the policies of two non-Western global powers (China and Russia) and two rising regional powers (Turkey and the United Arab Emirates), whose engagement in African affairs has grown significantly over the past two decades. The analysis investigates whether their positions on the Western Sahara conflict and the Maghreb are driven primarily by material interests – such as phosphates, fisheries, and energy resources – or by ideational factors, including normative concerns, reputation, status, and ideological affinities. Moreover, it underscores that Maghrebi actors have not been passive bystanders but have actively sought to engage these emerging powerhouses. Concretely, Morocco has stood out for its strategy of leveraging economic incentives to consolidate friendly positions or, at the very least, deter openly hostile stances against its interests. The article concludes that while material interests are not the primary drivers of these four countries’ policies toward the conflict, their engagement creates economic opportunities, particularly in the exploitation of natural resources.
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Lecha et al. (2025) studied this question.
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