ABSTRACT This article advances dual‐process theory (DPT) by developing a pragmatist framework for the study of reflective cognition. Although dual‐process models were introduced to sociology via Bourdieusian practice theory, Bourdieusian DPT has proven inadequate for theorising reflective cognition and action, with sociologists looking to pragmatism as an alternative. To support these efforts, I provide a synthetic, elemental account of the pragmatist theory of reflection, delineating reflective cognition's defining characteristics, core components, its relationship with non‐reflective cognition, and its interindividual variation. I then outline the merits of the pragmatist theory of reflection for dual‐process research, arguing that it not only addresses the major limitations of Bourdieusian DPT but that it has broad interdisciplinary support, provides advantages in terms of conceptualisation, operationalisation, and measurement, and opens new lines of inquiry. Overall, I argue that pragmatism provides a robust framework to enhance the study of reflective cognition and is a valuable, if not superior, theoretical alternative for dual‐process research.
Gordon Brett (Tue,) studied this question.