Philosophical paper challenges principle-based hylemorphism and proposes a modified view on object persistence.
Hylemorphism is the view that objects are compounds of matter and form. Principle-based hylemorphism is the view that forms are principles of unity. In this paper, I want to rise a challenge to contemporary versions of principle-based hylemorphism. It is commonly acknowledged by principle-based hylemorphists that (i) each object has, associated with its sort, certain persistence conditions, and (ii) for an object to be of a particular sort is for it to have a particular (kind of) form. If this is right, there must also be a close connection between an object’s form and its persistence conditions. The challenge to principle-based hylemorphism is to provide a reasonable explanation of this connection? I first argue that contemporary versions of principle-based hylemorphism fail to meet this challenge. Then, I suggest a modified version of principle-based hylemorphism – two-layered principle-based hylemorphism – that has the resources for providing the required explanation.
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Dirk Franken (2026) studied this question.
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