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The question of how states make operational decisions in cyber conflict is under-theorised. Much of existing scholarship has answered it within general frameworks of materialist and rationalist theory. Yet, states with similar cyber capabilities and operating in the same environment often display markedly different operational styles. This article argues that accounting for operational variation among states requires greater attention to how risk and threat perception shape operational preferences under uncertainty, particularly when multiple feasible options exist. To this end, the article develops a conceptual framework that distinguishes between a risk society, which tends towards operational restraint and caution rooted in a cultural preoccupation with the reduction of uncertain and diffused security risks, and a threat society, which exhibits operational brazenness owing to a fixation on a perceived existential threat. The article illustrates the framework within two case studies, the United States and Russia.
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Monica Kello (2026) studied this question.
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