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This exploration addresses Grouchy’s critiques and ideas on moral reasoning in her philosophical work, suggesting an alignment with Locke's thoughts.
As Kathleen McCrudden Illert notes in her introduction to this notable addition to the Ideas in Context series, the thought of Sophie de Grouchy (1763–1822) has long been overshadowed by the reputation of her husband, Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet. Grouchy is chiefly known for her 1798 translation of Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, and the critical reflections she appended to it under the title Lettres sur la sympathie. New editions of the Lettres by Marc André Bernier and Deidre Dawson in 2010 and, in English translation, by Sandrine Bergès and Eric Schliesser in 2019, have built a compelling case for renewed attention to Grouchy’s moral and political thought. To borrow from the subtitle Bergès and Schliesser gave their edition, Grouchy’s engagement with Smith was nothing if not ‘critical’. She dismissed Smith’s appeal to the judgement of the ‘impartial spectator’ as a contrivance, and chided him for embracing distinctions of rank, even as she defended the notion that sympathy played a constitutive role in moral reasoning. Tempting as it may be to read this avowedly egalitarian critique through the lens of the politics of the Directory, McCrudden Illert convincingly argues that in substance, the Lettres antedate the Revolution of 1789, and were probably composed between 1786 and 1789 as a response to the prize essay competitions offered by the Académie Française between 1781 and 1786 for the best elementary moral treatise on the duties of the man and the citizen. McCrudden Illert builds her case on close analysis of a fragment in the hand of Condorcet, commenting on an unnamed treatise on moral education, the contents and form of which appear to be a close match for the Lettres as published a decade later. In this earlier context, the Lettres stand in nearer relation to the debate on moral education prompted by the publication of Rousseau’s Emile in 1762. What Grouchy found in Smith’s concept of ‘sympathy’, McCrudden Illert suggests, was an alternative to Rousseau’s appeal to ‘pity’ as the affective ground of moral reasoning. ‘Sympathy’, as Smith had defined it, was used ‘to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever’. ‘Pity’ was limited to compassion in suffering and, on Rousseau’s account, survived in civilised society only in etiolated form. Grouchy did not follow Smith in his examination of the role of imagination in the refinement of moral judgement, but nor did she endorse Helvétius’s elision of sensation and reason. If Grouchy held ‘sympathy’ to provide a sensible basis for our moral ideas, she nonetheless held fast to the idea that the refinement of our moral judgement depended on reflective reasoning. For McCrudden Illert, Grouchy is better understood as a disciple of Locke than of Condillac.
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