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Investigates the impact of architectural design on cyber-risk propagation in critical digital infrastructure, suggesting proactive measures for improved resilience.
Cyber-attacks against Critical Digital Infrastructure (CDI) increasingly exploit architectural interdependencies to facilitate rapid lateral movement and systemic compromise. Traditional security frameworks focus on vulnerability mitigation but often leave propagation pathways structurally unconstrained. This study investigates whether proactive architectural design, specifically Trust-Boundary Mediation, can impose deterministic limits on compromise propagation. Using a network-science approach, we modelled a CDI environment (N=500 nodes) to compare propagation dynamics across Scale-Free (hub-dominated) and Small-World (segmented) topologies. An adapted Susceptible–Infected–Recovered (SIR) process was used to simulate adversarial movement . Empirical results demonstrate that while Scale-Free architectures suffered an 88.4% systemic compromise, the mediated architecture reduced the final epidemic size to approximately 5.0% of the network (0.050 ± 0.015), representing a ~95% reduction in compromise propagation. This security gain came with a negligible performance cost: a mean latency increase of only 0.45 ms . The underlying propagation dynamics are not specifi c to the simulated environment, they apply broadly to interconnected cyber-physical and digital infrastructure systems. These findings confirm that cyber resilience in CDI is an emergent property of network topology. "Architecture-First" design is not merely a best practice; it is a first-order control for systemic risk. Vulnerability management and perimeter defence are necessary but insufficient for systemic resilience in critical infrastructure. Resilience has to be engineer ed at the architectural level, by constraining structural connectivity before an attacker exploits it. Network topology directly determines whether a localised compromise stays local or cascades. That relationship is quantifiable, and quantifying it gives risk governance a structural lever it currently lacks. The approach generalises: energy grids, telecommunications networks, and industrial control systems all share the same underlying propagation physics. Index Terms : Critical Digital Infrastructure (CDI), Network Topology, Trust-Boundary Mediation, Cyber Risk Propagation, Network Science, Cyber Resilience, Spectral Radius.
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Chipasha et al. (2026) studied this question.
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