How to break the deadlock of coastal blue carbon ecosystem restoration? Empirical evidence from Zhejiang’s practices in China

The degradation of coastal blue carbon ecosystems (BCEs) is progressing rapidly, raising environmental concerns. The sustainable restoration of BCE faces formidable challenges, mainly due to the uncertainties of blue carbon benefits and the inadequacy of existing government incentives. This study proposes ‘carrot-and-stick’ incentive schemes through an evolutionary game approach grounded in the blueprint of eco-environment-oriented development (EOD). Given enterprises’ bounded rationality, this study reshapes their decision-making by applying the framing effect theory. Further, the optimal implementation timing of the incentive schemes was explored by embedding the Lotka–Volterra model into the evolutionary game model. Through empirical simulation of the EOD case in China, the study reveals that the ecological restoration of BCE proceeds through three stages: The initial, middle, and mature stages. The findings suggest that the government adopt phased incentive measures, starting with ‘more subsidies and fewer penalties’ in the initial stage and transition to ‘fewer subsidies and more penalties’ in the middle stage. Finally, they should implement ‘moderate levels of both subsidies and penalties’ before eventually phasing out the incentives. Furthermore, the rising quantity and price of blue carbon, along with a positive information frame, drive enterprises’ participation in ecological restoration. Moreover, China should formulate stage-based ‘carrot-and-stick’ incentives, accelerate the development of the blue carbon market, and flexibly regulate the information frame. This study provides reference values for policy and strategy formulation to promote the development of BCE ecological restoration.