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Negotiations reveal the Taliban's opportunistic strategy to maximize gains, impacting foreign relations and Afghan governance.
The negotiations with the Taliban started along various tracks in 2008, but only accelerated in 2018 to reach the February 2020 agreement between the US and Taliban. Even then, they were marred by a lack of cohesion among the US and its allies and partners, with the result of enabling the Taliban to extract concessions and to marginalise the Afghan government. While this led to accusations of the Taliban being untrustworthy ideological jihadists, in reality the Taliban approach to the talks was eminently opportunistic and focused on maximising their gains. Until 2020 at least, the Taliban assumed that they would have to form a coalition with other Taliban factions and groups, and it was only the inability of their counterparts to coordinate that allowed the Taliban to score a complete military victory in August 2021. The Taliban’s pragmatism was most evident in their approach to the various foreign jihadist groups that had supported their jihad, which were denied the recognition of what they thought was their right to pursue their own national jihads from Afghanistan after the Taliban’s victory. While the Taliban would struggle to bring the foreign jihadists under actual control, their approach had lost them the trust of the foreign jihadists.
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Antonio Giustozzi (2026) studied this question.
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