Purpose This study aims to examine how chief executive officer (CEO) attributes, namely, duality and compensation, affect corporate tax avoidance, with a particular focus on the moderating role of family ownership. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of 155 French firms listed on the CAC All-Tradable Index over the period 2011–2023, this study uses a generalized method of moments approach to address endogeneity concerns. Findings The results show that CEO duality and CEO compensation are positively associated with tax avoidance, indicating that CEOs with greater power and stronger incentives are more likely to engage in opportunistic tax strategies. The findings further reveal that family ownership plays a moderating role by amplifying these effects, suggesting that family-controlled firms reinforce rather than constrain managerial opportunism in corporate tax strategies. Research limitations/implications This study focuses solely on French publicly listed firms, which may limit the generalizability of the findings to other institutional contexts. The analysis is also restricted to CEO duality and compensation, leaving other CEO attributes unexplored. Practical implications The study provides important implications for policymakers and regulators. The findings highlight the need for stronger governance mechanisms to mitigate managerial opportunism, particularly in family-controlled firms where ownership concentration may exacerbate aggressive tax behavior. Social implications By shedding light on the drivers of corporate tax avoidance, this study contributes to the broader debate on ethical corporate behavior and its implications for transparency and fairness. Originality/value This study provides new evidence on the moderating role of family ownership in the relationship between CEO attributes and corporate tax avoidance, offering theoretical insights into the dominance of agency-driven incentives over socioemotional considerations in family firms and revealing the dark side of family control in a civil law context.
Dakhli et al. (Thu,) studied this question.