Metamorality: When Moral Compasses Lead to Moral Impasses

ABSTRACT People often endorse multiple moral values. In many real‐world contexts, these values come into conflict, with each pushing people to act in a different way. Moral conflicts can occur not only within individuals but also between individuals and groups. Hence, we need metamoral principles—that is, principles governing how to adjudicate between competing moral values—to guide moral decision‐making at intrapersonal, interpersonal, and intergroup levels. We argue that metamorality (second‐order moral principles) is not monolithic; various metamoral principles can culturally evolve. There is sufficient evidence for at least four metamoral systems: utilitarianism, honor, divinity, and self‐interest. We explain how this descriptive pluralistic approach to metamorality can explain real‐world phenomena. Implications of this model and future directions in moral psychology are discussed.