Phenomenology and psychopathology: interpretation, uncertainty, and discrimination

Phenomenological psychopathology has gained traction across psychiatry and philosophy. With this growing interest, two longstanding issues have resurfaced: first, a question regarding the clinical usefulness of phenomenologically grounded accounts of mental illness; second, a worry about the relative neglect of the sociological aspect of psychopathology. Acknowledging this, recent research initiatives have begun to reorient the field toward clinical integration and social relevance. This paper contributes to these efforts. It does so by demonstrating how phenomenologically grounded accounts can complement recent shifts in psychiatric diagnostic practice, while also bringing attention to the much-overlooked epistemic uncertainty involved in psychopathological research crucial for its development. In so doing, I show the continuing relevance of phenomenological psychopathology and its potential, when critically attuned to its own epistemic conditions, to offer a more thorough account of mental illness that can do justice to how marginalization constitutes psychopathology.