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This analysis explores how grounded cognition affects social cognition and theory of mind in autistic individuals, suggesting new insights into their perception and interaction.
Autistic people are often described as lacking the ability to infer others’ mental states and emotions, a cognitive ability referred to as Theoy of Mind (ToM). Drawing on findings from my research over the years and inspired by the Grounded Cognition approach, in this piece I raise questions about the role that perception and embodied experience may play in an autistic individual’s ability to develop a ToM and intersubjectivity. I proposed that what might initially appear to be an inability to infer others’ mental-emotional states is a reduced, but not absent, inference ability, or one that must first determine if others’ perceptual experiences are similar to one’s own. Building on this, I claim that Grounded Cognition can contribute to a better account of the mechanism that underlies social cognition and ToM in autism, and stress the need for increased examination of the role of sensory aspects in social cognition.
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Jad Brake (2026) studied this question.
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