Layering of informal organisations in international regimes: the G20 Common Framework and the sovereign debt regime

Given that informal organisations are thought to be easy to reform, why do states sometimes choose to create new informal institution rather than reforming existing ones? We argue states may introduce new informal layers to international regimes when the leading international organisation, even if still largely informal, becomes increasingly institutionalised, making it difficult to reform and integrate new members with diverse preferences. Further, we suggest the impact of new informal institutions on cooperation depends on the extent to which they create tensions with existing rules in the regime. We focus on the sovereign debt regime, which saw the introduction in November 2020 of the Common Framework for Debt Treatments, a new informal institution within the G20. We demonstrate that states created the Common Framework partly in response to the institutionalisation of the Paris Club, which made it more difficult to integrate China. We examine the impact of the Common Framework by comparing creditor coordination in Zambia and Sri Lanka, with only Zambia eligible for the Common Framework. This comparison reveals greater creditor coordination in Zambia than Sri Lanka, though the tensions introduced by the Common Framework nonetheless undermined the speed and quality of cooperation.