“People's Lawyers” versus “Elite Lawyers”: a comparative analysis of lawyer regulation in China and the United States

This article provides a comparative analysis of the Chinese and American regulatory models, centering on the contrasting professional identities of “People's Lawyers” and “Elite Lawyers.” Drawing on Abel, Lewis, and Boon's analytical dimensions of admission, conduct, and discipline, the study examines how each jurisdiction constructs professional identity and regulatory control through distinct institutional logics. China's state-led dual model combines administrative oversight with political embeddedness, while the US court-bar self-regulatory system relies on judicial supervision, market-driven stratification, and ABA accreditation. Power allocation diverges significantly: Chinese administrative organs hold ultimate authority over licensing and sanctions, whereas American state supreme courts exercise final control, with bar associations managing daily regulation. The analysis identifies reciprocal learning opportunities: China can adopt American refinements in ethical standards and disciplinary due process, while the United States may benefit from China's systematic legal aid framework and institutionalized public service commitments. The article offers reform proposals for each jurisdiction but acknowledges that comparative transplantation faces significant political and institutional obstacles. Ultimately, both models reveal similar power structures beneath their apparently neutral institutional designs.