Applying the Copernican Principle to the Problem of Induction

Hume argued that all inductive reasoning presupposes the uniformity of nature. He further argued that there was no successful non-circular argument for this uniformity presumption, hence, inductive reasoning was rationally unjustified. Here I apply the widely discussed Copernican principle and Gott’s delta- t method to argue that the observed uniformity of nature will almost certainly continue into the near future, and will quite probably continue into the distant future. Copernican reasoning uses only the observed duration of a phenomenon to predict its future duration, so this reasoning is non-circular. It also does not involve positing nomic necessary connections, as do many other attempts to answer Hume’s challenge. Copernican reasoning is controversial, as are many of its applications, but the application to Hume’s problem is one that even most critics of the Copernican principle should accept. If Copernican reasoning is ever applicable, it is applicable here. This opens up the possibility of using Copernicus to answer Hume.