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Philosophers of migration claim asylum seekers’ location is normatively arbitrary. They claim it is irrelevant whether asylum seekers are inside or outside their own state, and that it does not matter whether they are encountered at sea, in a refugee camp, or after crossing into another state. Such locational differences may have pragmatic relevance, but they don’t track anything normative. I disagree. I argue asylum seekers exercise self-help when leaving, and that they can exercise incomplete privilege when trying to enter another state. These normative entitlements must remain linked to be efficacious for refugees and liberal states. Asylum seekers can maintain this link by using their location to impose directed duties on a state. When such duties are triggered by presence in jurisdiction (rather than territory) they are thinner, broader, and more procedural than often supposed. This insight has implications for future research and theorizing on the refugee regime.
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Max Gabriel Cherem (2026) studied this question.
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