Nudging Across Borders? A Collaborative Governance Framework of European Cross-Border Public Procurement

While scholars have debated the utility of performance measures in monitoring public procurement, few have explored how policy nudges align political goals with contracting decisions. This article leverages insight from collaborative governance to assess how principal policy intentions may ultimately fail due to contracting authority preferences and suggest how policy nudges can help close the gap between policy objectives and implementation within public procurement decision-making. This research theoretically applies cross-border contracting as a collaborative arrangement between European countries abiding by agency theory tenets and empirically evaluates the degree to which governments engage in cross-border contracting in support of European integration. Analyzing award data reported on Tenders Electronic Daily from 2010 to 2019, findings suggest interorganizational processes, centralization of decision-making, fiscal and political environments, and social partnership dynamics matter in cross-border contracting decision-making. Recommendations for using policy nudges and public-facing performance measures to incentivize contracting authorities to procure cross-border are discussed.