Responsibility Transmission and Strategic Interaction in Post‐Accident Crisis Governance: A Quadripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

Post‐accident crisis governance does not end when an investigation report identifies causes and assigns responsibility. The unresolved issue is whether the accountability pressure generated by investigation can be carried into regulatory follow‐up, enterprise corrective action and public scrutiny. To address this issue, this study develops a responsibility classification framework and a quadripartite evolutionary game model involving accident investigation teams, regulatory authorities, accident‐involved enterprises and the public. The framework distinguishes four responsibility domains: political‐administrative responsibility, regulatory responsibility, professional responsibility and social responsibility. The model examines how these actors adjust their strategies under changing costs, sanctions, incentives and information conditions. The numerical simulations are used as theoretical scenario analyses rather than as empirical validation of a particular accident case. The results show that active fulfilment by accident investigation teams provides the initial accountability signal, increases the cost of regulatory inaction, strengthens deterrence for enterprises and improves the information basis for public scrutiny. Regulatory authorities play a stabilising and compensatory role when investigation pressure is weak or enterprise compliance is uncertain. Enterprise behaviour is the most unstable part of the system because it is highly sensitive to safety investment costs and exhibits a bistable pattern. Public participation does not directly determine equilibrium selection, but it can increase visibility, reputational pressure and regulatory attention when disclosure and reporting channels are available. By treating accident investigation as a process of responsibility transmission, the study shows that crisis prevention after accidents depends on whether accountability pressure survives several translations: from investigation to regulation, from regulation to enterprise corrective action and from public scrutiny to sustained observability. The findings highlight the importance of follow‐up verification, incentive adjustment and institutionalised public reporting channels.