Qualitative analysis reveals failures in Somalia stabilization missions due to political and operational issues, suggesting need for reform.
Purpose of the Study: This study examines why successive African Union stabilisation missions in Somalia have failed to achieve lasting peace despite nearly two decades of intervention. It investigates how mission creep, conceptual drift, political capture, and financial fragility have undermined strategic objectives, perpetuated dependency, and prevented sustainable security, governance, and long-term social transformation. Methodology: The study employs a qualitative, interpretive single-case design using structured documentary analysis. It analyses African Union, United Nations, and government reports alongside policy papers, scholarly literature, and contemporary institutional publications to examine the evolution of AMISOM, ATMIS, and AUSSOM and identify recurring strategic, political, and financial patterns across missions. Findings: The findings reveal that Somalia's prolonged stabilisation failure stems from interconnected structural and political factors rather than inadequate military capability alone. Mission creep expanded mandates beyond available resources, while conceptual drift blurred peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and state-building objectives, reducing strategic coherence. Political capture transformed international missions into instruments of domestic and regional political interests, weakening operational independence. Persistent dependence on voluntary external financing created financial fragility, culminating in funding crises that threatened mission sustainability. Consequently, successive missions achieved temporary military gains but failed to consolidate governance, strengthen Somali institutions, or establish conditions necessary for durable peace and security. Conclusion: The study concludes that sustainable peace in Somalia requires fundamental strategic reform rather than repeated mission rebranding. Success depends on clearly defined mandates, predictable financing, strengthened Somali ownership, and prioritising political settlement and institutional development alongside security operations to break the cycle of perpetual transition and dependency.
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Abdiweli et al. (2026) studied this question.
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