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Conceptual argument explores the verification gap in physical action for agentic AI, highlighting the need for accountable records.
As autonomous agents begin to act in the physical world, they inherit a problem the digital domain could ignore: the operational record of what is true at a place is largely self-attested and unverifiable. This paper argues that this verification gap becomes a binding constraint on safe physical action. It frames the core distinction as an asymmetry of evidence — computational claims can be checked by re-execution, whereas a physical human event happens once and cannot be re-run — and argues that a class of physical facts consists of authorizations by a party who can be held to account, which a system that answers to no one cannot discharge. It follows that an irreducible core of physical ground truth remains human even after perception is solved: not a measurement, but a witnessed judgment, recorded in a form an agent can verify without trusting or surveilling the person who made it. The paper argues non-surveillance as an epistemic requirement — a record usable against its author stops being true — and states the shape of such a record at the level of the data model rather than the mechanism. It is a conceptual argument, not a deployment report; implementation mechanism is deliberately withheld pending patent prosecution. Part of The Built-Environment Trust Trilogy (companion papers: The Verification Gap; The Digital Membrane).
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Florian Gypser (2026) studied this question.
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