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This study shows that greater personalism in the support party of incumbent leaders increases the likelihood of attacks on central bank independence. Using data on levels of personalism in the incumbent party in democracies worldwide from 1991 to 2020, it finds that personalist governments are more likely to publicly pressure the central bank to shift monetary policy (nearly always with an eye toward loosening it), as well as more likely to set in motion legal changes that decrease central bank autonomy. This finding holds even when accounting for other known factors associated with central bank interference, such as populist posturing. Put simply, where leaders backed by personalist parties come to power, we are likely to see greater efforts to steer monetary policy and weaken central bank independence. The election of personalist leaders therefore signals potentially higher and unpredictable patterns of inflation in the years that follow.
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Frantz et al. (2025) studied this question.
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