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This article critically assesses the notion of dignity used in recent Supreme Court judgments on ‘third gender’ and ‘transgender rights’ in South Asia, and suggests a reexamination of dignity as the basis for demanding justice for historical wrongs. Tracing the constitutional genealogy of the idea, I suggest that dignity has a distinctively European philosophical and legal origin. Yet the category of dignity has taken on a universal significance, and it has become a platform for demanding all kinds of rights and making appeals for the assuagement of political, moral, social and cultural injuries in the postcolonies. By juxtaposing the conception of dignity with the demand for izzat (respect), I argue that the notion of dignity – as it is freely deployed in discourses on human, gender and queer rights, and assumed to be contingent upon the fulfilment of one’s (gender) identity – fails to address the demand for justice made by hijras in Pakistan. Demands for justice, I further argue, are raised in the context of historical dispossession of hijras by the colonial state and their exclusion from middle-class sharafat (respectability). Challenging their dispossession, hijras identify with middle-class signs of ‘progress’ and question traditional hierarchies, identities and sources of izzat.
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Salman Hussain (2019) studied this question.
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