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A central debate in the philosophy of perception concerns the range of properties that can be represented in perceptual experience. Are the contents of perceptual experience restricted to ‘low-level’ properties such as <it>location</it>, <it>shape</it> and <it>texture</it>, or can ‘high-level’ properties such as <it>being a tomato</it>, <it>being a pine tree</it> or <it>being a watch</it> also be represented in perceptual experience? This paper explores the bearing of <it>gist perception</it> on the admissible contents debate, arguing that it provides qualified support for the claim that certain kinds of high-level properties—such as <it>being a natural scene</it>—can be perceptually represented.
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Tim Bayne (2016) studied this question.
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