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Explores regulatory capture risks in policy implementation by NGOs, suggesting attention to socio-institutional contexts.
Involving regulatory intermediaries (RIs) such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) enriches participation in regulatory policy implementation. However, it also exposes the regulatory system to new forms of capture. Through a perspective of social and institutional embeddedness, the study investigates regulatory capture through NGO‐RIs. Examing outcomes of the regulatory system of China's Environmental Public Interest Litigation (EPIL) with in‐depth interviews and a fuzzy‐set qualitative comparative analysis, the study found that regulatory systems intermediated by NGO‐RIs were likely captured when the regulatory targets had strong political ties, or when strongly‐tied NGO‐RIs intermediated locally or in non‐local jurisdiction with weak judicial institutions. The findings show that both social and institutional dynamics independently or jointly shape a regulatory system's susceptibility to capture through NGO‐RIs. They call for stronger attention to socio‐institutional contexts in implementation design. They also underscore the need to strengthen intermediary autonomy and the institutional foundation for effective intermediated regulatory implementation.
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Ma et al. (2026) studied this question.
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