Abstract Mixed signals by the West (the USA and its NATO allies) provided encouragement for the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The charge that the invasion was a case of failed deterrence thus has some merit. Russia was already predisposed to attack its neighbour but acting on that predisposition was eased by a calculation in Moscow that the chance of Russia being punished for its act of transgression was low. Ambiguous, or mixed, signals are more likely to be discounted than heeded by a potential aggressor. Other than in very circumscribed circumstances (for instance, the conditions that might trigger nuclear use), ambiguity has limited benefit. It suggests a lack of commitment, undermines the credibility of defence alliances and partnerships, and encourages malfeasance. Ultimately, it exposes a vulnerable state to a higher level of danger. These were the features of the road to ruin that led to Russian aggression. The problems of mixed signals have an ongoing relevance to the effectiveness of Western policy when squaring up to Russia over Ukraine and to China in the Asia–Pacific.
Webber et al. (Wed,) studied this question.