Putin's Early NATO Discourse And The Myth Of Ignored Russian Security Interests

This article challenges the post‑2014 Russian claim that NATO enlargement systematically ignored Russia’s legitimate security interests. Drawing on Vladimir Putin’s own speeches and interviews from 2000–2004, combined with primary documents such as the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act, it demonstrates that Moscow repeatedly accepted Alliance enlargement, deepened institutional cooperation, and even contemplated Russian membership. The analysis further argues that the eventual estrangement between Russia and the West was driven less by external military encirclement than by Russia’s internal economic stagnation and rent‑dependence. As fossil‑fuel revenues became the cornerstone of authoritarian stability, Western decarbonization policies threatened the economic foundations of regime endurance—reframing the West in Moscow’s discourse from a partner to an existential danger. The “broken promises” narrative thus emerges as a retrospective legitimation strategy masking an internal crisis of political economy rather than a genuine reaction to NATO behaviour.