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Purpose Amid rising environmental expectations, green supply chains must balance profitability, sustainability, and fairness. This study examines how government subsidies, retailer green service investment, and fairness preferences jointly influence optimal pricing, product greenness, service effort, and profit allocation.Design/methodology/approach A Stackelberg game-theoretic model with a manufacturer and a retailer is developed. Four scenarios are analyzed: no intervention, subsidy only, service only, and combined subsidy–service. The model further incorporates fairness concerns of either party using an asymmetric Nash bargaining framework.Findings The results show that government subsidies improve product greenness and supply chain profitability, particularly when aligned with retailer-led green service investments. Service investments enhance demand but may reduce profits without policy support. Fairness preferences also reshape decision outcomes: manufacturer fairness raises prices but reduces efficiency, whereas retailer fairness promotes equity but may weaken upstream sustainability. A fairness sensitivity threshold enables profit coordination with minimal efficiency loss.Practical implications Aligning public subsidies with retailer green service initiatives can improve both environmental performance and supply chain profitability.Originality/value This study integrates economic incentives and behavioral fairness considerations into a unified framework for analyzing sustainable supply chain strategies.
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Chanhthabounxay et al. (2026) studied this question.
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