a plea for a child-orientated ethics of childhood

What do we owe children from an ethical point of view? What should an ethics of childhood look like? The answers depend on how the child-adult distinction is conceptualised and the normative conclusions drawn from it. This paper critically examines two influential interpretations: the Liberal Standard View (LSV), which uses autonomy and rationality as ethical benchmarks, and the Social Constructivist View (SCV), which sees the child-adult distinction as socially constructed, highlighting inequalities and marginalisation. Both frameworks, however, face significant challenges in justifying their normative claims. To address these limitations, this paper proposes a novel, discourse-ethics–inspired approach grounded in Grice’s theory of meaning. This framework not only respects children’s autonomy and rationality but provides a non-arbitrary basis for ethical claims from children. By integrating children’s perspectives through philosophical dialogue, theapproach challenges traditional power dynamics and recognises children as authoritative voices in ethical debates. The power of the framework is illustrated with an analysis of children’s views on privacy, revealing how their unique perspectives enrich ethical discussions.