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Tourism quality certification aims to reduce information asymmetry in service markets. This study empirically examines whether Korea’s national tourism certification programme serves as an effective economic signal of service quality. Using hedonic pricing models and discrete choice experiments, we jointly evaluate supply-side pricing behaviour and demand-side preferences of international tourists. Certified accommodations were found to charge an average premium of KRW 21,000, indicating that providers incorporate the certification in pricing. However, tourists’ willingness to pay is statistically indistinguishable from that for a placebo label, suggesting that the signal is weakly recognized on the demand side. Online reviews, by contrast, exhibit consistently higher explanatory power for perceived quality. These findings, interpreted through the lens of signalling theory, highlight a structural imbalance between provider incentives and consumer interpretation. To improve effectiveness, certification should target credence attributes – such as hygiene and safety – that consumers cannot easily assess, alongside stronger mechanisms for reliability, selectivity, and awareness.
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Park et al. (2026) studied this question.
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