Research on supply chain collaboration strategies under manufacturer-built industrial internet platforms based on evolutionary game theory: a dual perspective of government subsidies and trust relationships

Industrial Internet platforms are a key driver of digital transformation in manufacturing, but their success depends on broad supplier participation. This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model involving governments, suppliers, and manufacturers to examine how subsidies and trust shape suppliers’ adoption of manufacturer-built industrial Internet platforms, with numerical simulations used for validation. The results show that platform development follows clear stage-specific patterns. In the exploration stage, high adoption costs and low trust discourage supplier participation, making government subsidies essential for improving platform governance and supporting value-added services. In the growth stage, continued policy support and stronger trust jointly promote supplier adoption and sustain manufacturers’ value-added service strategies. In the maturity stage, market mechanisms gradually replace direct intervention, while high trust and effective supply chain coordination enable self-sustaining platform development. These findings provide theoretical support for stage-specific public policy, platform governance, and supplier participation decisions, and offer practical insights for the sustainable development of industrial Internet platform ecosystems.