Sein, Sollen, Wollen : Recasting Legal Norms in a Logical-Teleological Key

This article substantiates Dworkin’s conjecture that the distinction between legal rules and principles is logical by advancing a logical-teleological framework grounded in the triad of facticity ( Sein ), prescriptivity ( Sollen ), and collective will ( Wollen ). It demonstrates that principles, rules, and policies correspond to irreducible logical forms: principles as value-based categorical judgments, rules as hypothetical judgments, and policies as relational judgments that coordinate diverse norms towards shared objectives. This framework posits Wollen as the essential bridge between facticity and prescriptivity, revealing the intrinsic purposive architecture of law , which the rule-principle dichotomy obscures. This reconstruction enriches the processes of adjudication, legislation, and legal education, offering a diagnostic tool for navigating the complexities of the modern regulatory state and legal technology.