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July 30, 2026Journal of Theoretical Politics

The politics of self-imposed term limits

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Authors

JMJacob Morrier

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Overview

This article examines how candidates' voluntary term limit pledges can affect electoral dynamics, implying potential voter benefits.

Key Points

  • This article aims to explore how self-imposed term limits can arise endogenously within a political model and their implications for electoral accountability.
  • Extended a two-period political agency model with adverse selection and added an election campaign component.
  • Analyzed equilibrium scenarios where candidates voluntarily pledge not to seek reelection.
  • Characterized conditions under which term limit pledges are informative and enhance voter welfare.
  • Term limit pledges can form in equilibrium without requiring commitment power.
  • Strong candidates use these pledges to signal their type to voters, gaining an electoral advantage.
  • The effectiveness of pledges lies in candidates' ability to make policies without career constraints, rather than the information conveyed.

Cite This Study

Jacob Morrier (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a6af4ad60e2b924d3ea02bfhttps://doi.org/10.1177/09516298261469574
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Also Consider

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  1. 1Beyond the last term : Analyzing politicians' responsiveness in a no-term-limit context2026
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  3. 3Political accountability under moral hazard2024 · 4 citations
  4. 4More Electoral Competition Without More Voter Participation: Quasi-Experimental Test of a Term Limit Reform in Ecuador2024
  5. 5The determinants of political selection: a citizen-candidate model with valence signaling and incumbency advantage2024 · 1 citations