Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Schwartz (2015) argues that a rational decision-maker should not always strive for maximization. In cases where it is not possible to assign probabilities and/or weights to the possible outcomes of choice alternatives, Schwartz argues it is better to engage in robust satisficing, ensuring a good enough outcome when things go awry. Schwartz thus argues that robust satisficing is normatively valid. I focused in my comment on whether it may also be descriptively valid. I propose that in everyday decision making, robust satisficing may occur via regret minimization. Hence, counterfactual thinking and anticipated emotions may be the proximal psychological processes for robust satisficing.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Marcel Zeelenberg (2015) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: